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Abstract. Monitoring and automation of the critical infrastructures like the 
power grid is improvised by the support of an efficient and secure communica-
tion network. Due to the low cost, low power profile, dynamic nature, improved 
accuracy and scalability, wireless sensor networks (WSN) became an attractive 
choice for the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) system of the 
smart grid. However, the energy efficiency and security of WSN depends high-
ly on the network design and routing scheme. In this paper, a WSN based Se-
cure and Energy Efficient Remote Monitoring Technique (SERMT) is proposed 
by demonstrating a WSN based ICT network model for pervasive monitoring of 
the generation and transmission part of the power network in a smart grid sys-
tem. The performance of the proposed network model designed for a smart grid 
of IEEE 118-Bus system coupled with the secure routing technique is tested 
during cyber-attacks by means of NS2 and the simulation results indicate that it 
performs better than existing smart grid monitoring methods like Lo-ADI [1] 
with respect to packet drop count and throughput. 
Keywords: Information and Communication Technology, Wireless Sensor 
Network, Cyber-attacks, Remote Monitoring, Smart sensor nodes, Smart Grid. 
1 Introduction 
A sustainable lifestyle for human race is reliant upon critical infrastructures like pow-
er network, communication network, water supply system, transportation system etc. 
Therefore, pervasive monitoring [2] and control over such critical systems is very 
important. It is to be noted that only an improved Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) can transform every such system into a smart system and thus can 
form a smart city. Smart grids are an inherent part of a smart city and it is obtained by 
incorporating features like full-duplex communication between the ICT entities, au-
tomated metering in the smart homes, power distribution automation, and above all 
intelligent decision making by means of pervasive monitoring of the power system 
and securing its stability. Therefore, it is beyond any question that the ICT network of 
a smart grid must be accurate, scalable, and secure enough to instantly identify any 
kind of abnormal behavior in the entities of the power network, securely communicate 
that information to the control center (CC) and thereby help in taking necessary and 
timely action to ensure uninterrupted power supply. 
Although, designing of a robust ICT network for smart grid has become a boiling 
topic of research, the best suited ICT design for a smart grid is still not very clear. In 
[3] only a crude idea of the design of a joint power-communication network is given 
using a test system consisting of 14 buses. While, the authors of [4], have come up 
with a realistic design of the ICT for smart grid by taking help from a power utility in 
the U.S. Southwest; their ICT system relies completely on wired channels that either 
use SONET-over-Ethernet or Ethernet-over-Dense Wavelength Division Multiplex-
ing. A completely wired ICT system is neither cost effective nor energy saving. Every 
communication entity in [4] draws power and thus a huge amount of power is devoted 
for monitoring the power network itself. Moreover, addition/isolation of ICT entities 
for hardening purpose or fault tolerance/during a failure or a security threat is ex-
tremely difficult and costly in a wired system.  
Smart sensor nodes like Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are popular in remote 
monitoring system for smart grid. Power generation and transmission, power quality, 
equipment fitness, load capacity of equipment and load balancing in the grid can also 
be monitored by data sensing techniques. As a result, wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs) are currently acquiring attention of the researchers for the purpose of design-
ing the ICT network for a smart grid system. WSNs are comprised of low powered 
sensor nodes with easy installation process, lesser maintenance requirement, low in-
stallation cost, low power profile, high accuracy and scalability. All these have con-
vinced the researchers that WSNs are a very good choice for the designing of the ICT 
of a smart grid. Therefore, in this paper, a new design of the ICT network for a smart 
grid is proposed using WSN.  
Despite all these advantages, the most common drawback of a sensor node is that it 
is battery powered and battery replacement is difficult. As a result, energy conserva-
tion becomes important. In Secure and Energy Efficient Remote Monitoring Tech-
nique (SERMT) energy efficiency is obtained by energy aware routing and use of 
more expensive rechargeable Energy Harvesting Sensor Nodes (EHSNs) for MU and 
PMU data transfer respectively. Also, the sensor nodes as well as the wireless chan-
nels are vulnerable to common cyber-attacks [5] like sinkhole, wormhole, Sybil at-
tack, packet eavesdropping, flooding attack and most importantly false data injection 
attack by means of node compromise. SERMT aims at securing the data transfer to-
gether with energy conservation by means of light weight security protocols used in 
[6] like Elliptic-Curve-Public-Key Cryptography (ECC), Elliptic-Curve-Diffie-
Helman Key exchange scheme (ECDH), Nested Hashed Message Authentication 
Codes (NH-MAC) and RC5 symmetric cypher. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
ICT network setup phase for SERMT. A realistic risk model for the SERMT network 
design is given in section 3 of this paper. Mitigation of the threats discussed in section 
3 by adopting a secure and energy efficient routing technique is explained in section 
4. Section 5 does performance analysis of the proposed scheme SERMT by means of 
comparing the simulation results with an existing secure remote monitoring technique 
for power grid named as Lo-ADI [1]. Sections 6 concludes the paper and discusses 
the scope for future works. 
 2 Overview of the ICT network setup phase for SERMT 
In order to provide a reliable remote monitoring for the smart grid, a generic ICT 
network design is proposed by SERMT that can be applied on any given power net-
work. In this section, the network setup phase for SERMT is divided into four steps. 
Each step is illustrated with the help of IEEE 14-Bus system as the power network. 
 
Fig. 1. Region division and sensor node placement in a smart grid of IEEE 14-Bus system 
In the first step, a given power grid is divided into several substations. The buses 
connected by transformers are placed in one substation with the assumption that trans-
formers remain within a substation only [7]. This process is repeated until no trans-
formers are left. Then each bus is placed in a unique substation. In Fig.1, the IEEE 14 
bus system is divided into 11 substations denoted by 𝑆𝑖 where i is the substation ID.  
After the substation division, the distance between all pairs of substations (𝑆𝑖& 𝑆𝑗) 
is calculated [4]. Now, starting from a substation 𝑆𝑖 with the maximum connectivity 
among the substations at the network borders, all substations which are within a given 
distance of it, are marked as substations of a common monitoring region 𝑅𝑥. Then the 
next substation which is the closest to 𝑆𝑖 but beyond the given distance and which is 
not yet placed in a monitoring region, is selected and the same process is repeated. 
This process is continued till every substation is placed within a monitoring region. 
For example, in the IEEE 14-Bus system, substations 𝑆3, 𝑆4, 𝑆5, 𝑆6, 𝑆7, 𝑆8 and 𝑆10 are 
at the borders of the smart grid area. Among them, 𝑆4 has the maximum connectivity, 
therefore the region division starts from it. Fig 1. shows that after this process is com-
pleted, the smart grid network for IEEE 14-Bus system is divided into 4 regions. 
SERMT considers two different types of smart sensors for monitoring the power 
network entities. The first type is the Measuring Unit (MU) based smart sensors [8]. 
The MU-based smart sensors have a sensing unit consisting of sensors like Current 
Transformer (CT) and Voltage Transformer (VT) and a merging unit for performing 
signal amplification, conditioning and analog-digital conversion. There is an internal 
clock in the merging unit that can timestamp every sample and thereby time synchro-
nize them with an external UTC source. The MU-based sensor has a network com-
munication module which helps it to communicate with Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs) or applications. The second type of sensors used for SERMT is the PMU-
based smart sensors. The sensing module of a PMU has sensors like voltage and cur-
rent sensor which provide analog inputs for the PMU. Current and voltage phases are 
sampled at a rate of 48 samples per cycle in a PMU using a common time source for 
synchronization. It also has an internal clock and a processing module responsible for 
signal conditioning, timestamped analog-digital signal conversion and computing 
voltage and current phasors to produce a synchronized phasor and frequency. 
In this step, MU-based sensors are placed at every bus in the power network. 
PMU-based sensors are placed at some of the buses using an optimal PMU placement 
algorithm [7]. Low-cost, non-rechargeable battery enabled sensor nodes denoted 
by 𝑁𝑗 with ID j are randomly dispersed across the network area. These  𝑁𝑗𝑠 can carry 
the MU-based sensor data to the CCs in a power efficient manner. A phasor data con-
centrator (PDC), responsible for receiving accumulating PMU data from multiple 
PMUs, is placed at each region of the smart grid and few EHSNs denoted by  𝐸𝑆𝑗  with 
j as the ID are randomly deployed across the smart grid region. The idea behind the 
deployment of the two kinds of sensor nodes is that, the cheaper  𝑁𝑗𝑠 will follow an 
event-driven hierarchical routing approach to send the MU data from the MU-based 
sensor nodes to the CCs; and the  𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑠 will always be active to accumulate synchro-
phasor data from the substations of each region and send the data to the local PDCs 
and finally to the CCs. Due to the high volume of PMU data transfer from each sub-
station having a PMU, the sensor nodes carrying them should always be active.  
In Fig.1. the MU-based sensors are denoted by 𝑀𝑖 where i is the ID of the sensor 
and it is same as the bus number it is placed at. The PMUs are represented by 𝑃𝑖  and 
they are numbered in the order they are placed. It is assumed that  𝑁𝑗𝑠 and  𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑠 are 
deployed region wise and are numbered in the order of their deployment.  
SERMT assumes that there is a main CC and a backup CC. So, even if the main 
CC is damaged, the backup CC can efficiently monitor the network state. The connec-
tivity of each substation is calculated based on the number of transmission lines con-
necting that substation with other substations. The substation having the highest con-
nectivity is selected as the main CC and that having the second highest connectivity is 
selected as the backup CC. After the CCs are selected, all substations are equipped 
with a router acting as a gateway for the substation servers and the servers in each CC 
are access points for the operator. The CC-gateways can wirelessly receive data from 
the sensors and PDCs and send those data to server via a wired LAN connection in 
control centers. In the Fig.1., 𝑆1 is the main CC and 𝑆2 is the backup CC. 
 3 Risk model and assumptions for the SERMT network setup 
The WSN nodes are vulnerable to several attacks that are explored by researchers 
over the ages. In SERMT, some of the common attacks on WSN are considered. The 
threat model for SERMT predicts that a compromised entity of the ICT can pretend as 
a CC-gateway and congest the network with bogus communications to launch a flood-
ing attack which can result in denial of service (DoS) by the ICT entities. Another 
common attack of the WSN is the Sybil attack [5] where a legitimate node of the 
network gets compromised and deceits the other nodes by providing multiple fake 
location information of itself. In SERMT network setup, any ICT entity except the 
substation entities can impose a Sybil attack and oblige other entities to forward data 
to an entity that does not exist in that location resulting in increased packet drop. In a 
node compromise attack, the attacker physically gets hold of the node and reprograms 
it to launch attacks like wormhole attack and packet eavesdropping attack [5]. These 
attacks can also be launched by an outsider’s node deployed in the network. The 
Sinkhole attack can be launched by attackers with high quality equipment and they 
can inform the ICT entities about a high-quality entity in their sensing zone, so that all 
the other entities select it to forward the data to the CC. This node gathers all the data 
the CCs do not receive any information about the system state from the network. 
In order to provide security to the ICT infrastructure for the smart grid, the follow-
ing assumptions are made in the proposed work: 
1. The substation equipment like the server and the gateway are trustworthy and it is 
impossible for an attacker to compromise those components. The servers authenti-
cate themselves to the sensors or PDCs to avoid flooding attack [5]. 
2. Each entity of the ICT network is provided with a global key 𝐺𝐵𝐾 which an at-
tacker cannot get hold of even if the entity is compromised. 
3. A unique set of elliptic curves is stored in the memory of each ICT entity for the 
purpose of ECC and ECDH protocols. Also, in order to achieve those mechanisms, 
it is assumed that any pair of entities in the network agrees upon all the domain pa-
rameters of the elliptic curves stored in them. 
4. The two CC-servers generate two separate one-way hash chains using SHA-1 hash 
function [6]. The starting key for each chain is randomly selected by the each of 
the servers. All the ICT entities are provided with same hash functions and the last 
keys of the two chains so that they can authenticate the control messages from the 
control center servers and avoid a Sinkhole attack. 
5. Each ICT entity in the network is aware of its own ID, location information, region 
ID and ID of the servers. 
6. All the PDCs can communicate with other PDCs in the neighboring regions. 
4 Secure and Energy Efficient Routing Scheme of SERMT 
The goal of the ICT network for a smart grid is to securely transmit the sensed data 
from the sensors to the control centers and help in remote monitoring of the power 
grid. In order to achieve this with the help of a WSN based ICT network, a secure and 
energy efficient routing technique should be followed. In this section, the secure rout-
ing scheme of SERMT is divided into 4 modules.  
4.1 Module 1: Initial trust value estimation of the ICT entities 
In the first module of SERMT, the main control center server (𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1) sends a 
number of test messages to the sensor nodes and PDC in its own region to calculate 
their Trust value (𝑇𝑉𝑖) . The message format is: 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1 →∗
: 𝑀𝑆𝐺||𝐾𝑥||𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐺𝐵𝐾; 𝑀𝑆𝐺||𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1𝐼𝐷||𝐾𝑥) where * denotes a set of ICT enti-
ties, MSG is the test message, 𝐾𝑥 is a random key from the sequence of keys generat-
ed by the hash function and this key is never used again. A Hash based Message Au-
thentication Code (HMAC) is generated over the MSG, server ID and the key using 
the shared global key GBK and appended with the message, so that any non-
legitimate node which do not have the GBK and the server ID cannot  separate the 
HMAC from the original message and therefore cannot overhear the message from 
the server to the other entities. The 𝑇𝑉𝑖  is calculated by the server for each entity i 
using eq.1. 
                                               𝑇𝑉𝑖 =
𝑀𝑆𝐺𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑀𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100                                           (1) 
Entities having a 𝑇𝑉𝑖  of more than 40% are selected as trusted nodes and any legit-
imate node having a lower 𝑇𝑉𝑖  are added to the threat list of the server. Now, the node 
𝑋𝑖 with the highest 𝑇𝑉𝑖  in that region is selected by the CC-server to forward a request 
message to the nodes closest to it in the adjacent regions. The format of the request 
message is: 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1 → 𝑋𝑖: 𝑅𝑄𝑀||||𝐾𝑥||𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐺𝐵𝐾; 𝑀𝑆𝐺||𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1𝐼𝐷||𝐾𝑥)  where 
RQM is the request to calculate  𝑇𝑉𝑖 , 𝐾𝑥 is a new random key from the key chain and 
HMAC is generated and appended with the message. First, the 𝑇𝑉𝑖 of the nodes of 
adjacent regions closest to 𝑋𝑖 are calculated by 𝑋𝑖 in the same manner. If those nodes 
have a 𝑇𝑉𝑖  greater than 40% then the RQM is forwarded to them. These nodes now 
calculate the 𝑇𝑉𝑖  of the nodes in their respective regions and send a list of blocked 
node IDs having low  𝑇𝑉𝑖  to the CC-server via 𝑋𝑖 . The message format is: 𝑒𝑖 →
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1: 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑_𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡||𝑒𝑖𝐼𝐷||𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑_𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡||𝑒𝑖𝐼𝐷) . The 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1  updates 
the threat list using this data. This process is repeated till the threat nodes of each 
region are identified by 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1 . 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1 shares the threat list with 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟2  via a 
shortest path consisting of nodes in the trusted list. After both the servers get the list 
of trusted nodes in the network, the trust value of each node is shared with the substa-
tion gateways by 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1, via a shortest path to the substation consisting of the most 
trusted nodes. This whole process is repeated at a regular time interval by alternate 
CC-servers. Each time the new trust values are assigned to the ICT entities, both the 
servers compute a public-private key pair (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖) and share their public 
key with all the entities in the network by broadcasting.  
 4.2 Module 2: Data sensing by the smart sensor nodes and data forwarding by 
substation gateways 
The next phase of SERMT is the data sensing phase. In this phase, the smart sensors 
collect data from the power entities and forward that to the substation gateways. The 
substation gateway is assumed to be trusted. The CC-gateways forward the data di-
rectly to the connected servers, but they still need to send data to the other CC. The 
gateways work differently for sending MU-based and PMU-based sensor data to the 
CCs. In order to send the MU-based sensor data, the gateways send a forward request 
message to each jth node (𝑁𝑗) of that region at one-hop distance from it. The format of 
the request is: 𝐺𝑊𝑖 → 𝑁𝑗: 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤_𝑅𝑄𝑀||𝐺𝑊𝑖𝐼𝐷||𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐺𝐵𝐾; 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤_𝑅𝑄𝑀||𝐺𝑊𝑖𝐼𝐷). 
Each 𝑁𝑗 receiving the forw_RQM from the gateway sends back an acknowledgement 
(ACK) appended with information like their remaining battery power (𝐵𝑃𝑗) and its 
connectivity with other nodes in the same region (𝐶𝑗) to the sender in the format: 
𝑁𝑗 → 𝐺𝑖: 𝐴𝐶𝐾 ||𝐵𝑃𝑗|| 𝐶𝑗||𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐺𝐵𝐾; 𝐴𝐶𝐾 ||𝐵𝑃𝑗|| 𝐶𝑗) . In case a node receives 
forw_RQM from multiple gateways in that region, it selects the one closest to it.  The 
substation gateways calculate a data forwarding score 𝐷𝐹𝑗 for all the nodes sending 
back ACK to it using eq. 2. 
                                              𝐷𝐹𝑗 = 𝐵𝑃𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑉𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝑗                                                            (2) 
Now, each gateway 𝐺𝑊𝑖 generates a key pair having a public and a private key 
(𝑈𝐺𝑊𝑖 , 𝑣𝐺𝑊𝑖) using ECC and forward the public key 𝑈𝐺𝑊𝑖 to the j
th  sensor node hav-
ing the highest 𝐷𝐹𝑗  calculated by itself using the message format: 𝐺𝑊𝑖 →
𝑁𝑗: 𝑈𝐺𝑊𝑖||𝐺𝑊𝑖𝐼𝐷||𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐺𝐵𝐾; 𝑈𝐺𝑊𝑖||𝐺𝑊𝑖𝐼𝐷) . The 𝑁𝑗  receiving the public key 
from the 𝐺𝑊𝑖 also generates a private-public key pair (𝑣𝑁𝑗 , 𝑈𝑁𝑗) using ECC and send 
back the public key and its ID in the similar format to 𝐺𝑊𝑖. 𝐺𝑊𝑖  now computes a 
point in the elliptic curve (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘) = 𝑣𝐺𝑊𝑖  . 𝑈𝑁𝑗  and 𝑁𝑗  computes a point (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘) =
𝑣𝑁𝑗  . 𝑈𝐺𝑊𝑖  where 𝑥𝑘  , the x coordinate of the computed point becomes their shared 
secret. This is ECDH key exchange scheme where the shared secret calculated by 
both parties is same─ 𝑣𝐺𝑊𝑖  . 𝑈𝑁𝑗 = 𝑣𝐺𝑊𝑖  . 𝑣𝑁𝑗 . 𝐺 = 𝑣𝑁𝑗  . 𝑣𝐺𝑊𝑖 . 𝐺=𝑣𝑁𝑗  . 𝑈𝐺𝑊𝑖; where G 
is the generator of the elliptic curve. This shared secret 𝑥𝑘 is the temporary key for 
exchanging encrypted data between the 𝐺𝑊𝑖 and 𝑁𝑗. 𝐺𝑊𝑖 now encrypts the aggregat-
ed MU data from the buses of that substation using RC5 symmetric cypher with 𝑥𝑘 
and forwards that to 𝑁𝑗 by using NH-MAC in the format: 𝐺𝑊𝑖 →
𝑁𝑗: 𝐸𝑀𝐷||𝐺𝑊𝑖𝐼𝐷||𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐺𝐵𝐾; 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑘; 𝐸𝑀𝐷||𝐺𝑊𝑖𝐼𝐷)). The gateways keep on 
forwarding the encrypted MU data to the same node until the servers initiate a new 
round of module 1. 
At the same time, the PMUs also sense data from the power entities and send that 
to the corresponding substation gateway. Each PMU containing substation gateway 
now forwards forw_RQM to the EHSNs of that region within its range. In the similar 
way, the 𝐸𝑆𝑗s receiving the forw_RQM sends back ACK to the gateway with only the 
connectivity information. Now, the gateway recalculates the 𝑇𝑉𝑗  for each 𝐸𝑆𝑗  like 
module 1 and selects the node with the highest current 𝑇𝑉𝑗. The same key exchange 
scheme is established with the most trusted 𝐸𝑆𝑗 as it was done with the 𝑁𝑗s and the 
RC5 encrypted PMU data is forwarded to 𝐸𝑆𝑗 in the similar format with NH-MAC. 
𝐺𝑊𝑖s recalculate the 𝑇𝑉𝑗 of the 𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑠 at regular intervals to repeat this process of key 
and data exchange and do not wait for the servers to estimate 𝑇𝑉𝑗  of the 𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑠. How-
ever, if a server reinitiates module 1, all the substation gateways wait till the process 
is complete and they are updated with the new trust values of all the nodes in their 
region. The CC-gateways also use the same process to send data to the other CC. 
4.3 Module 3: Data forwarding to the control centers 
In this module, two separate routing techniques are followed by the  𝑁𝑗𝑠 and  𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑠 to 
forward data to the CCs. 𝑁𝑗𝑠 receiving data from the 𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑠 first decrypt them using 
the same temporary key 𝑥𝑘. Then, a join request (join_RQM) is broadcasted in the 
format:𝑁𝑗 →∗: 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑄𝑀||𝑁𝑗𝐼𝐷||𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐺𝐵𝐾; 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑄𝑀||𝑁𝑗𝐼𝐷) to all other  𝑁𝑠 in 
that region by that 𝑁𝑗 . Malicious nodes present in the network receiving the 
join_RQM cannot decode the HMAC as they do not have the GBK and thereby they 
cannot join any legitimate data-carrying 𝑁𝑗 . Each 𝑁𝑗  receiving ACK from other 𝑁𝑠 
provide a cluster ID to each of the 𝑁𝑠  in the format 
RegionID||Timestamp_for_current_𝑇𝑉𝑖  ||𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝑜𝑓_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐷𝑠 .  The server as-
signed timestamp value for current 𝑇𝑉𝑖  is same for all the nodes in a common region 
and the list of substation IDs denote the data carried from which of the substations in 
that cluster. Therefore, all the nodes getting the common cluster ID are considered as 
nodes of a cluster. Multiple clusters can be formed in each region of the smart grid. 
After the cluster formation in every region, a cluster head (CH) is selected for each 
cluster using a candidate value (𝐶𝑉𝑗) calculated using eq.3. by each node j in the clus-
ter and shared with all other nodes in the cluster.  
                                                 𝐶𝑉𝑗 = 𝐵𝑃𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑉𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝑛𝑗                                                            (3) 
In eq.3. 𝐵𝑃𝑗  is the remaining battery power of the node, 𝑇𝑉𝑗 is the current trust val-
ue of the node and 𝐶𝑛𝑗 is the connectivity of that node with the nodes of other adja-
cent regions. The 𝐶𝑛𝑗 of a node is determined based on the number of nodes in other 
regions that are within the sensing radius of the node j. Now, the CH generates a pub-
lic-private key pair like 𝐺𝑊𝑖 and share the public key with each of the nodes in the 
cluster. The cluster member nodes (CMNs) also generate the key pair, send their pub-
lic key to the CH and compute their own 𝑥𝑘 using ECDH. Each CMN now forwards 
its data to the CH by encrypting the data with the 𝑥𝑘 using RC5 and generating NH-
MAC just like each 𝐺𝑊𝑖 did. The CHs after receiving the data from the CMNs, de-
crypt them with the  𝑥𝑘 for that CMN. Now each of the CHs aggregate the data ob-
tained from the member nodes and encrypt that with the public key (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1) of the 
main CC-server using ECC based public key cryptography. In case, the main CC 
fails, the network is informed about that and all data are forwarded to the backup CC.   
 Now, a CH of the main CC region, directly forwards the encrypted-aggregated data 
to the main CC-gateway. Other CHs use a modified version of Dijkstra’s shortest path 
algorithm to send the aggregated data to the main CC-gateway.  In this algorithm, the 
weight values (𝑊𝑖𝑗) of the link between two nodes i and j are determined by eq.4.  
                                                  𝑊𝑖𝑗 =
𝐷𝑖𝑗
(𝐵𝑃𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑉𝑗)  
⁄                                                   (4) 
In eq.4. 𝐷𝑖𝑗  stands for the distance between the sender i and the receiver j, 𝐵𝑃𝑗 is 
the remaining battery and 𝑇𝑉𝑗 is the trust value of the node j. The same route is fol-
lowed by the nodes for sending data to the main CC until new nodes are selected by 
𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑠  for data forwarding. The main CC-gateway generates the HMAC over the re-
ceived message to check its authenticity and if a match is found, the data is forwarded 
to 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1.  𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1 periodically sends backup to the 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟2 via the shortest path 
from 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1 to 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟2, determined using the same modified Dijkstra’s algorithm. 
In order to forward the PMU-based sensor data to the CCs, each data-carrying 𝐸𝑆𝑗 
node checks if the PDC of that region is adjacent to it. Each 𝐸𝑆𝑗 is updated with the 
location information and the current 𝑇𝑉𝑗 of other 𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑠 and the PDC in that region by 
the 𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑠 of that region. If a PDC is adjacent to an 𝐸𝑆𝑗, then the 𝐸𝑆𝑗 first decrypts the 
data and generate a public-private key pair to share the public key with the PDC. The 
PDC also does the same and share back its public key with the 𝐸𝑆𝑗 to complete the 
ECDH key exchange. The node 𝐸𝑆𝑗 now forward the encrypted NH-MAC-ed data to 
it. 𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑠 which are not near a PDC, select the shortest path consisting of the most 
trusted 𝐸𝑆𝑠 from itself to the PDC in that region to send their public key and the same 
route is followed by the PDC to send back its own public key to the 𝐸𝑆𝑗. Now, the 
encrypted data is forwarded through the same path to the PDC. The PDC of each 
region acts in the similar way as a CH. It decrypts the data from each 𝐸𝑆𝑗 using the 
unique 𝑥𝑘 for that node and aggregates the whole data. A shortest path consisting of 
PDCs only, from each PDC of the network to both the control center gateways are 
calculated only once and is never repeated until a PDC of a region is replaced or a 
PDC fails. In case, the 𝑇𝑉𝑖  of a PDC drops below the threshold, the 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1 adds it to 
the blocked list and selects the most trusted 𝐸𝑆𝑗  node to perform the function of a 
PDC, until the actual PDC is replaced by a new one or its fault is diagnosed and re-
covered by the operator. Now, the aggregated data is encrypted using the public key 
of the 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟1 by each PDC and forwarded to the main CC-gateway. The same pro-
cess is repeated for 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟2. Both the CC-gateways authenticate the received data 
and forward it to their connected servers for evaluation.  
The energy consumed by both the N nodes and ES nodes in transmitting a message 
(𝐸𝑇) is the summation of energy consumed by their power amplifier (𝐸𝐴) and it is a 
function of distance from which the message is sent, baseband DSP circuit (𝐸𝐵) and 
front-end circuit (𝐸𝐹) . The energy consumed in receiving a message (𝐸𝑅)  is the 
summation of 𝐸𝐵, 𝐸𝐹  and the energy consumed by Low-Noise Amplifier 𝐸𝐿.  
5 Simulation Results 
In this section, a smart grid network of IEEE 118-Bus system is considered. The total 
network region is divided into 8 regions and the power grid is divided into 107 substa-
tions. Substation 61 is selected as the main CC and it consists of 3 buses─68,69 and 
116. Substation 16, consisting of buses─17 and 30, is selected as the backup CC. The 
main CC is in region 1 and the backup CC is in region 2 of the smart grid. In order to 
analyze the performance of SERMT in this network setup, a total of 500 N type 
nodes, 300 ES type nodes and 8 PDCs (high quality EHSNs with longer communica-
tion range) are deployed in the network area and simulation is performed using 
NS2.29 network simulator. The simulation results are compared with the Lo-ADI [1] 
technique that incorporates a secure token exchange mechanism among the WSN 
nodes. The simulation parameters are given in table.1. 
Table 1. Parameter list for simulation 
Parameter Description 
Operating system Fedora 
Simulator NS2.29 
Compiler  TCL 
Rechargeable battery for EHSNs NiMH 
Battery capacity of EHSNs 2000(mAh) 
Initial battery power for all nodes 150 (mAh) 
   
Fig. 2. Avg. BP consumed vs. Attack interval        Fig. 3. Number of malicious nodes vs. pack-
et drop percentage 
In Fig.2, the average battery power consumed per hour by all types of sensor nodes 
is shown for different attack intervals in both Lo-ADI and SERMT. It is observed that 
the average battery power consumption of SERMT is a little higher than that of Lo-
ADI and this battery power consumption does not decrease if the attack interval is 1 
second as in Lo-ADI due to connection revoke and packet drops, rather its battery 
power consumption increase if the attack interval is less as SERMT immediately adds 
the malicious node into its threat list and resends the packet to some other trusted 
node. Moreover, due to the presence of ESs, the average residual energy in the net-
work will always be more than that of Lo-ADI. In Fig.3, it is proved that even though 
 SERMT consumes more power than that of Lo-ADI because of using several power 
consuming security mechanism computations and key exchange protocols, it wins in 
terms of offering security to the smart grid. Fig.3. shows, percentage of packets 
dropped in presence of different number of malicious nodes in the network and it is 
observed that in SERMT, the packet drop percentage is much lesser than that of Lo-
ADI even when there are 35 malicious nodes in the network. 
6 Conclusion and Future Works 
The region based remote monitoring adopted by SERMT helps in easy identification 
of a failure in the power grid or an attack in the communication network of the smart 
grid. Security of sensor data is of utmost importance in the smart grid as any altera-
tion of the data can lead to wrong decision by the operator and this might badly harm 
the smart grid. Data privacy is obtained in SERMT by the encryption/decryption 
mechanisms, data integrity is verified by the hashed message authentication and au-
thentication of data is done by the one-way hash chain, therefore all the data security 
measures are addressed by SERMT. One drawback of SERMT is that it cannot deliv-
er the sensor data from the sensors to the control centers in a very short time due to 
the security measures it follows and this can be explored in future research how the 
time delay be reduced in a secure communication technique for smart grid. Designing 
a threat model with attacks on MUs, PMUs, gateways or servers and analyzing the 
effect of cyber-attacks on power grid can be another direction of future work. 
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